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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 
BOGIES, INCORPORATED, ~\ 
vs. 10397 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a corporate ) 
body politic, Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This action was brought by a corporate tavern 
Lessee-operator, not a building owner, to compel the 
Salt Lake Licensing Director to issue a Class B beer 
license and Liquor Consumption license. The licenses 
had been refused on the basis that applicable zoning 
did not allow that type of business, though they had 
1 
been granted historically for 6 years prior to the instant 
refusal, with plaintiff having been in possession for one 
year prior to refusal. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LO,iVER COURT 
Case was heard upon stipulated facts and reciprocal 
motions for summary judgment. After argument, the 
trial Court held that Salt Lake County, by its prior 
conduct of ignoring the enforcement of zoning and 
subsequent annual renewals, is now estopped from 
refusing plaintiff a license to operate the premises as 
they had been operated in the past. The Court ordered 
that such licenses shall continue to be issued for so long 
as plaintiff remains in possession of said premises under 
its present lease. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent contends that the judgment of the 
trial Court should be affirmed. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
Since the case was tried upon stipulated facts, that 
Stipulation is herewith set forth in full: 
I. 
"Plaintiff is a corporation licensed to do busi-
ness in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
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an<l Defendant is a corporate body politic existing 
urnler and by virtue of Title 17, Ch. 4, et seq., 1953 
Utah Code Annotated, and is authorized to license 
cabarets au<l issue beer licenses and liquor consump-
tion licenses within the confines of the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, as set forth in Title 17, 
Ch. 1, Sec. 21, 1953 Utah Code Annotated, and 
that business, known as the Black Hand Lounge, 
1s within the confines of defendant County, and is 
situate at 7263 South State Street, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
II. 
"Commencing in the year 1958 the premises 
popularly known as 7263 South State Street, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, were licensed by 
Defendant to se:rve bottle and draft beer, and the 
premises situate there have continuously since said 
date been so licensed by Defendant until objection 
was raised on the 30th day of June, 1964. 
III. 
"On or about the 21st day of January, 1963, 
Plaintiff leased said premises for a term which ex-
pires in November, 1967, with an option for re-
newal for an additional five years for use as a 
cabaret, and in reliance upon being permitted 
license for Class B beer and liquor consumption 
li~enses, and since said day and until the 30th day 
of June, 1964, said business has been so conducted 
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under license from Defendant by Plaintiff, though 
during the period July 1, 1963 to June 30, 1964, 
licenses were issued in the name of one, Reba J. 
Clerico, who was merely in there as an operator 
for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has since the 21st day 
of January, 1963, been the sole and only person 
authorized to conduct business upon said premises, 
individuals named being only managers. 
IV. 
On or about the 1st day of October, 1963, 
Defendant notified Plaintiff that subsequent li-
censes would not be issued because said premises 
were zoned C-2 and not C-3, as required for the 
type license historically issued upon said premises. 
v. 
Plaintiff has made substantial improvements 
at said premises and is absolutely obligated upon 
the lease for said premises through the month of 
November, 1967, and the continuing and accruing 
sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars 
($225.00) per month in an absolute obligation from 
Plaintiff-Lessee to the Lessor of said premises. 
VI. 
It is agreed that the sole and only issue to be 
determined in this matter is whether or not De-
fendant should be estopped from preventing re-
licensing upon the basis of improper zoning by 
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reason of past acquiescence in waiving zoning re-
quirements and the reasonable reliance thereon by 
Plaintiffs of past acquiescence and permissive vio-
lation of said zoning ordinance, and upon that basis 
the issue of law to be determined is should the Court 
issue an order compelling permanent annual re-
newal of said type licenses for said premises for 
so long as said premises are maintained and operat-
ed by Plaintiff strictly in accord with all other 
ordinances of Salt Lake County, State of Utah." 
ARGUMENT 
Point One: Defendant, by its past conduct in fail-
ing to enforce zoning ordinances in connection with 
plaintiff's business, and in making annual renewals, 
after plaintiff relied on such past conduct, is now estop-
ped from refusing plaintiff a license to operate its 
business at those premises as had been done in the past. 
It must be clearly understood that these premises 
had been licensed for the conduct of a cabaret com-
mencing in the year 1958. The licenses were renewed 
annually by defendant in the years 1959, 1960, 1961, 
and 1962. In 1963, plaintiff took the lease relying upon 
past apparency that such premises could be operated 
as a cabaret. Plaintiff was first licensed and operated 
ihe premises in 1963 and was refused licenses in 1964. 
Most certainly, plaintiff would not have obligated 
itself to an absolute lease through the month of No-
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vember, 1967, had it not relied upon the concept that 
there was assured future use because of past use and 
initial grant of license. If licenses had not been granted, 
the lease would not have been made. 
There is modern tendency to invoke estoppels 
against public authority when equity and justice require 
such application. See 19 Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 168, 
p. 821. 
Appellant relies upon the Utah case of Morrison 
vs. Horne, 12 Utah 2nd 131; 363 Pac. 2nd 1113 (1961), 
as authority for the denial by this Court of invoking 
equitable principals of estoppel against municipalities. 
That case is distinguishable. The plaintiff in that action 
purchased so-called commercial property that was in 
a residential zone at a period that was after 5 years 
from abandonment of its use as a store. The plaintiff 
attempetd to show that the prior owners and himself 
had determined, prior to this 5 years' abandonment, 
that the property would be used as a service station, 
eventually. This Court held that no such proof was 
offered and the case held there was abandonment of 
a prior non-conforming use for more than a year under 
the statute. It did not appear that the plaintiff made 
any undertaking or expenditures in reliance on the 
right to be granted a service station, as distinguished 
from a mercantile store, on the basis of the assessor's 
mistake in carrying the property as commercial rather 
than residential. Also, there was attempt to change a 
prior use which plaintiff here is not attempting. 
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The zoning in the case at bar is in a commercial 
area on South State Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
and there is another cabaret properly zoned for opera-
tion within 200 yards of the premises of plaintiff. Con-
sidering similar competing business very close to-
gether, with 4 years' history of operation, ordinary 
persons should be entitled to rely upon a 4-year past 
operation, when to deny them that right makes them 
liable to their lessor for the sum of Two Hundred 
Twenty-Five Dollars ($225.00) per month through the 
month of November, 1967. 
Defendant-Appellant's statement that there is no 
claim or evidence that another business properly al-
lowed by zoning cannot be profitably operated on the 
premises is a non-sequitor, because plaintiff is a cabaret 
operator. Such concept might become important, as 
pointed out in the case of Fass vs. City of Highland 
Park, 326 :Mich. 19; 39 NW 2nd, 336 (1949), if the 
plaintiff here was owner of the property. Most certainly 
a purchaser of property should be more wary and more 
chargeable with zoning restrictions on property he 
purchases than would ordinary persons who are merely 
leasing premises for the continuation of a business that 
has been historically operated by others. 
This Court could well distinguish between a pur-
chaser of property having constructive notice of zoning 
regulations pertaining to the property to be purchased, 
and one who merely leases a going concern in reliance 
on appearance in a general business area where other 
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similar businesses are conducted and where the leased 
premises have been used for the identical type business 
for a long period of years prior to leasing. 
Despite respondent's urging this Court to distin-
guish between lessees of a continuing business and pur-
chasers of a new property, there is the case of District 
of Columbia vs. Cahill, 54 Fed. 2nd 453 (CADC 1931), 
that did not make that distinction, yet ruled in favor 
of a person having a business in an improper zone. 
From 1911 to 1926, prior owners of the property and 
successive tenants openly conducted a garage and stor-
age business without objection. In 1926, Cahill bought 
the property and applied for and received a building 
permit to repair and improve it as a garage. The permit 
was issued and the owner spent $6,000 on improvement 
before the permit was revoked. The District Court 
voided the revocation and the Circuit Court affirmed, 
acknowledging that this is the type case warranting 
application of estoppel against a municipal body. 
This Court should also so rule, because of historical 
operation and initial grant of licenses to this plaintiff 
by Salt Lake County. This record states that substantial 
improvements have been made by plaintiff on the lease<l 
premises, and it is submitted that the rationale and 
holding of the Washington, D.C., case is on all fours 
with the case at bar. Affirming the Trial Court assures 
the perpetuation of the concept that the ultimate object 
of equity is to see that justice under all the circumstances 
is done. 
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Respondent urges that in this case the public author-
ity, in the exercise of proper supervisory and overseeing 
authority could, and perhaps should, have prevented the 
commencement of this type business in an improper zone 
in the year it was first licensed, 1958. It didn't, and 
the business operated for six ( 6) years before attempts 
to close it were initiated, after plaintiff had it only one 
(I) year and had assumed long term lease liability and 
made substantial improvements. 
Presumably any member of the public injured by 
improper business in an improper zone had the same 
right to object to the same public authority, but didn't. 
There was not only long failure to act which was 
passive acquiescence, but there was positive action taken 
by the public authority in the initial granting of license 
and positive action on each annual renewal. 
Plaintiff reasonably acted on past action and ap-
pearance and reasonably made substantial improve-
ments, not only with the active approval of the public 
authority, but also with the apparent approval of the 
affected public. Supra, People ex. rel. Beardsley vs. 
Rod'. Island, 215 Ill. 488; 74 NE 437. 
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• I CONCLUSION 
I 
Principles of equity require that defendant be j 
estopped from putting plaintiff out of business until its 
lease expires, by its terms. The trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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